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Abstract: We explore how and by how much the values of elasticities of substitution affect 
estimates of the cost of emissions reduction policies in computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models. We use G-Cubed, an intertemporal CGE model, to carry out a sensitivity and 
factor decomposition analysis. The decomposition analysis determines the contributions of 
changes in average abatement costs and changes in baseline emissions to the change in total 
mitigation costs. The latter has not previously been considered. Average abatement cost rises 
non-linearly as elasticities are reduced. Changes in the substitution elasticities between 
capital, labor, energy, and materials have a greater impact on mitigation costs than do inter-
fuel elasticities of substitution. The former have more effect on business as usual emissions 
and the latter on average abatement costs. As elasticities are reduced, business as usual 
emissions and GDP growth also decrease so that there is not much variation in the total costs 
of reaching a given target across the parameter space. Our results confirm that the cost of 
climate mitigation policy is at most a few percent of global GDP. 
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1 Introduction 
Most countries recognize the need to transition to a low carbon economy in response to the 
threat of global climate change due to emissions of anthropogenic greenhouse gases. 
Growing global energy demand relative to the availability of fossil fuels, concerns over 
energy security, and countries’ desires to lead the alternative energy technology industry are 
also driving alternative energy and energy efficiency policies around the world (Sunstein, 
2007-2008; Houser et al. 2008; Boyd, 2012; Kennedy, 2013). 
How difficult will such a transition be? Existing research and policy analysis provides a wide 
range of answers. For example, Tim Jackson and Nicholas Stern, both advisors to the British 
Government, take completely different positions. Jackson (2009) argues that the transition to 
a low carbon economy is so hard that, in order to have any chance of sufficiently 
decarbonizing, economic growth must stop. But the Stern Review (N. Stern, 2007) concluded 
that a global climate policy that limits greenhouse gas concentrations to 550 parts per million 
(ppm) of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) will only reduce global GDP through 2100 by 1% 
of what it otherwise would be (Dietz and N. Stern, 2008). Using an endogenous growth 
model with resource constraints, Acemoglu et al. (2012) similarly claimed that ambitious 
climate policies could be conducted without sacrificing long-run growth. However, Hourcade 
et al. (2011) argued that the elasticity of substitution between “clean” and “dirty” sectors that 
Acemoglu et al. (2012) used to produce these results is far too large and unrealistic. They 
found that “with a more plausible value of ε = 0.5 (elasticity of substitution), climate control 
(in the model) is impossible without halting long-term growth”. 
Though the conclusions of the Stern Review are based on an integrated assessment model, not 
all such models find that the costs of emissions reductions are that low. The 22nd Energy 
Modeling Forum revealed a wide range of costs across the participating integrated assessment 
models (Tavoni and Tol, 2010). At the extreme, the SGM model finds Indian GDP to be 66% 
lower than it otherwise would be in 2100 for one of the 550 ppm CO2e scenarios. 
Additionally, most of these models failed to simulate the most stringent target - an 
atmospheric concentration of no more than 450 ppm CO2e (Clarke et al., 2009). Thus there is 
great uncertainty about the costs of climate change mitigation. 
Despite such model comparison exercises as EMF22, because models are so different from 
each other and are so complex, it is very hard to understand what really drives such 
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differences in estimated costs. It would be easier to understand the impact of changes in 
assumptions by carrying out a sensitivity analysis of a single climate policy model, which we 
do in this paper. 
There has been extensive work on modeling the costs of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation using the tools of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models (e.g. Garnaut, 
2008; Treasury, 2008). The elasticities of substitution between energy and other inputs and 
among fuels have been claimed to be “the single most important parameters that affect the[ir] 
results.” (Bhattacharya, 1996, 159). Furthermore, “in the economic literature, there is little 
consensus about different elasticities for energy products” (Bhattacharya, 1996, 159). A 
meta-analysis (Stern, 2012) found much variation in the estimated elasticities of substitution 
between fuels and that estimates based on time-series such as those used in the G-Cubed or 
IGEM (Goettle et al., 2007) models tend to underestimate the long-run possibilities of 
substitution between inputs. Similar results were found by a meta-analysis of the substitution 
possibilities between energy and capital (Koetse et al., 2008). Most leading climate policy 
CGE models assume that substitution possibilities in production are quite limited (Pezzey and 
Lambie, 2001). By contrast, Beckman and Hertel (2009) argue that studies based on the 
GTAP-E model understate the cost of meeting mitigation targets due to overstating the price 
elasticity of demand for oil. 
Though there has been extensive research comparing the results of different climate change 
policy evaluation models (e.g. Clarke et al., 2009; Kriegler et al., 2015), there have been few 
published systematic sensitivity analyses of individual CGE models.1 Those that do exist 
mostly address issues other than climate change (e.g. Abler et al., 1999; Belgodere and 
Vellutini, 2011), aspects of climate change other than the costs of mitigation policies (e.g. 
Elliott et al., 2012), or the effects of parameters other than the elasticities of substitution (e.g. 
McKibbin et al., 1999). Systematic sensitivity analyses of much simpler aggregated 
integrated assessment models such as Nordhaus’ (1993) DICE model are of course more 
common (e.g. Butler et al., 2014).   
In apparently the first systematic sensitivity analysis of an individual CGE model, Jorgenson 
et al. (2000) found that reducing substitution elasticities in production in the IGEM model to 
                                                
1 It does seem to be becoming more common to report tests of sensitivity to few key 
parameters in papers using CGE models (e.g. Dessus and O’Connor, 2003; Meng et al., 2013; 
Schenker, 2013; Lanzi and Wing, 2013).  
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zero from their time-series estimated values resulted in a quadrupling of the estimated carbon 
permit price over the policy period and a doubling to quadrupling of the resulting change in 
Gross Domestic Product. Jacoby et al. (2006) provide some limited evidence on the effect of 
elasticities of substitution on the costs of mitigation policies in a global model. They find that 
the results are most sensitive to the energy-value added elasticity of substitution, but neither 
in this nor in later papers (e.g. Webster et al., 2012) do they provide much detail. Babonneau 
et al. (2012) carry out a Monte-Carlo analysis of the GEMINI-E3 CGE model assuming that 
the standard deviation of the elasticities of substitution is 30% of their mean values. They 
find that increased flexibility lowers the carbon price and the welfare cost and that the results 
are more sensitive to the substitution elasticity between capital, labor, energy, and materials, 
than to the interfuel elasticities of substitution. Though they target absolute emissions 
reductions, they calibrate the rates of technical progress associated with each factor so that 
baseline economic growth and energy consumption match those in the World Energy 
Technology Outlook (European Commission, 2007). Thus they “filter out” the effect of 
changes in the elasticities of substitution on business as usual (BAU) emissions. 
In this paper, we explore how, and by how much, assumptions about elasticities of 
substitution affect estimates of the cost of emissions reduction policies in CGE models by 
using G-Cubed (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1999), an intertemporal CGE model, to carry out a 
sensitivity and factor decomposition analysis. McKibbin et al. (1999) carried out a sensitivity 
analysis of the Armington elasticities and the capital adjustment cost parameters in G-Cubed. 
These had important impacts on the size of international capital flows and exchange rates in 
simulations but did not change the overall insights of the G-Cubed model. But there are no 
published results for the sensitivity of the G-Cubed model to the elasticities of substitution in 
production and consumption. 
Compared to Jorgenson et al. (2000), our analysis is innovative in using a global rather than 
national model. Results may differ across countries as well as being different in a global 
general equilibrium model than in a single country model. Also, in contrast to Jorgenson et 
al. (2000), we use absolute rather than relative emissions reduction targets, though our 
analysis allows us to draw conclusions about the costs of relative targets too. In contrast to 
Babonneau et al. (2012), we allow changes in the elasticities of substitution to affect business 
as usual economic and emissions growth. This turns out to have very important effects on the 
results. We then carry out a decomposition analysis to determine how the change in costs can 
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be attributed to changes to the business as usual emissions scenario and changes to average 
abatement costs. Also, while Babonneau et al. (2012) only test the effect of changing all 
production side elasticities simultaneously, we examine the effect of varying elasticities of 
substitution across different productions sectors as well as in consumption. As we use a 
carbon tax rather than carbon permits, our results are not affected by the wealth effects of the 
distribution of permits. This is also the reason that we focus on GDP rather than consumption 
as our measure of cost. Consumption losses are strongly affected by how climate policy is 
implemented. Finally, in contrast to Babonneau et al. (2012), we also assess the effects of 
weaker policy goals than the objective of a 2.1ºC increase in temperature by 2100. 
In our sensitivity analysis, we assess the effects of variation in the following key parameters: 
• Elasticities of substitution in production between fuels. 
• Elasticities of substitution in production between capital, labor, energy, and materials. 
• Elasticities of substitution in consumption for both these categories. 
We assess the costs of climate change mitigation globally and in the eleven G-Cubed model 
regions using changes in GDP relative to BAU. We evaluate three possible absolute 
emissions reduction targets for each set of parameter values. The paper is structured as 
follows. The second section, following this introduction, discusses the default assumptions of 
the G-Cubed model that are most relevant to our sensitivity analysis. The third section 
describes the theory of measuring the effect of elasticities of substitution on mitigation costs 
and the decomposition method used to analyze the results of our experiments. The fourth 
section describes the research design in terms of policy targets and parameter variations. 
Section 5 reports the results and the sixth section concludes. 
2 Default Assumptions 
The G-Cubed model is a global intertemporal CGE model that has been used for both climate 
policy and macro-economic analysis that uses nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
functions to model production and consumption opportunities and assumes that technological 
change is exogenous and factor-specific. The version of G-Cubed that we use in this study is 
version 110D, in which the world is divided into 11 regions. The parameter values provided 
in this version of the model are the default parameters that we then perturb in our sensitivity 
 
 
6 
analysis. The regional and sector aggregation is described in Tables I and II. A more detailed 
description of the model structure is presented in the Appendix. 
We implement climate policy scenarios using an economy-wide carbon tax per unit of carbon 
emitted in all production sectors. Carbon emissions are computed by multiplying each energy 
good with a fixed carbon coefficient. Though G-Cubed can also model permit trading 
schemes, we do not model such a scheme here because that would create an additional 
potential policy dimension - the initial permit allocation - which would result in substantial 
wealth transfer between economies in a global model like G-Cubed. 
McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999, 2013) describe how the default parameters in G-Cubed are 
estimated econometrically using a consistent time series (at 5 year intervals) derived from US 
input-output tables and other data sources. To obtain an estimate of the inter-fuel elasticity of 
substitution for each industry they estimated a system of cost share equations derived from an 
energy unit cost function for each industry together with the unit cost function. Similar 
approaches were used for the inter-material, inter-factor, and consumption elasticities of 
substitution. These estimates assume no technical change and as the input-output data are 
pentennial the time series are very short and in the case of the top tier, capital is assumed to 
be fixed in the short run in the estimation procedure. Additionally, time series estimates tend 
to converge to short-run rather than long-run elasticities of substitution (Stern, 2012). 
Therefore, the elasticities would generally be smaller than those from empirical studies that 
attempt to estimate long-run elasticities and the small samples may be associated with high 
sampling variability. Furthermore, these US elasticity estimates are applied in all countries, 
though the distribution parameters of the CES functions vary between regions and are 
estimated using the GTAP input-output database. Therefore, it is very plausible that the true 
parameters could deviate significantly from the default parameters used in G-Cubed. Table 
III provides a summary of these default values for the parameters of interest. What would 
happen when we allow these parameters to vary across regions is an interesting question, 
which we do not address in the current research. 
The top tier substitution elasticities of all the sectors are broadly within the range of Koetse et 
al. (2008)’s meta-analysis, which indicates that the energy-capital substitution elasticity is 
between 0.4 (short-run) and 1.0 (long-run) for North America and between 0.2 (short-run) 
and 0.8 (long-run) for Europe. The main exceptions are in the coal-mining sector and the 
agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting sector. 
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Stern’s (2012) meta-analysis showed that the inter-fuel substitution is greater than one, but 
the estimates on the macro-level are smaller than those on the sub-industry level; and 
elasticities estimated using time series data are smaller than those estimated using cross-
section data. All the default interfuel elasticities of substitution in G-Cubed are less than 
unity. The electricity sector is of most interest as it covers a significant portion of energy use 
and the elasticities are quite small - both the interfuel and interfactor elasticities of 
substitution are assumed to be 0.2. Note that we only explicitly model fossil fuels and generic 
electricity in G-Cubed. A solar technology is modeled as an electricity generation technique 
that uses lots of capital and little fossil fuel to generate electricity (Pezzey and Lambie, 2001). 
3 Business as Usual Scenarios, Policy Targets, Cost Metrics 
A Business as Usual (BAU) scenario is a projection of future economic variables and 
emissions based on various assumptions about the future without a climate policy. In 
assessing a specific policy, the results are usually reported in terms of deviations from BAU. 
In this study, the BAU scenario changes every time we change the elasticities of substitution. 
Therefore, there are three issues in designing an effective and valid way of carrying out 
policy experiments for this study. First, is there any real world economic implication of 
changes in the BAU scenario due to the change of elasticity parameters? Second, what kind 
of policy and policy target should we use in the study? Third, since the BAU scenarios vary, 
how can we decompose the effect of changed parameters on the BAU scenario and on the 
measure of mitigation costs? As we will see below, these questions are interconnected. 
Elasticities of substitution and rates of technological change have two main effects on the 
costs of climate mitigation policy in a CGE model-based analysis – they alter the BAU 
scenario and they change the cost of cutting emissions by a given amount from any particular 
initial level. In general, the more flexible the economy is and the faster technological change 
is, the higher GDP is in the BAU scenario. The latter is an obvious implication of standard 
growth theory. The former is an implication of the de La Grandville (1989) hypothesis, which 
proposes that the rate of economic growth is faster the higher the elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor. 
In the G-Cubed model, the CES functions are normalized in order to fit the data on input and 
output quantities and prices in the initial year (the baseline point). When the elasticities of 
substitution are set to different values, given the levels of technology remain unchanged, the 
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distribution parameters (𝛿!!/! , 𝑗 = 𝐾, 𝐿,𝐸,𝑀) as in equation (A1) in the Appendix will vary in 
order to match the data at the baseline point. However, this only constrains the baseline point 
and quantities and prices in other years of the BAU scenario change systematically. Existing 
studies avoid consideration of the change in the BAU scenario by either only considering 
abatement in percentage terms relative to BAU (Jorgenson et al., 2000) or by adjusting other 
model parameters so that the BAU scenarios under the alternative parameter sets are the same 
as under the default parameter set (Babonneau et al., 2012). Our approach differs from both 
these approaches, as we use absolute targets and we allow the BAU scenario to change as we 
change the parameters of interest. Rather than keeping the required percentage reduction in 
emissions constant as the parameters are changed, our decomposition analysis allows us to 
decompose the change in GDP losses into the change due to the change in required abatement 
and the change in average cost of abatement. The problem with preventing variation in the 
BAU scenario across different parameter sets is that, various parameters can be used to keep 
the BAU scenario the same as the default model. This raises the issue as to how to justify 
which parameters should be chosen and how the choice will affect the policy scenarios 
quantitatively. Additionally, only several key variables such as GDP and emissions will be 
the same in the default and adjusted BAU scenario while other variables such as the structure 
of production might change. We think that making these additional changes complicates 
interpretation of the decomposition as now multiple additional parameters are being changed 
and we can no longer assess the impact of the elasticities of substitution alone. 
From our simulations with G-Cubed, we find that emissions also grow more rapidly when the 
economy is more flexible. This makes sense, as we would expect higher energy use when 
GDP is higher if the supply of fossil energy is largely unconstrained as it is in our model. 
Similarly, faster labor augmenting technical change would be expected to increase energy 
use. Faster energy augmenting technical change would be expected to reduce energy use and 
hence emissions. But due to the rebound effect the reduction is less than one might naively 
expect; and the higher the elasticity of substitution between energy and the other factors of 
production the greater the rebound (Saunders, 1992). This means that, the more flexible the 
economy and the faster the rate of labor augmenting technical change, the greater the amount 
of emissions that will have to be cut to reach a given policy target in terms of an absolute cut 
in emissions relative to a base year.  
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We decompose mitigation costs as follows. For an absolute emissions target, given the vector 
of elasticities of substitution, 𝜎!, we can decompose the GDP losses relative to BAU as 
follows: 
 Δ𝐺𝐺!"# ≡ Δ𝐺/𝐺!"#Δ𝐸/𝐸!"# × Δ𝐸𝐸!"# ≡ Δ𝐺Δ𝐸× Δ𝐸𝐸!"# ×𝐸!"#𝐺!"# (1) 
 
where we define !!!!  as the average cost of abatement,  !!/!!"#!!/!!"# as the cost elasticity of 
abatement,  !!!!"# is abatement relative to BAU, and !!"#!!"# is BAU emissions intensity. In our 
analysis, the loss in GDP is measured as the net present value of the accumulated changes in 
GDP from 2013 to 2030, using a discount rate of 4%.2 Of course, the decomposition of GDP 
losses that we use here is not unique and decompositions into further factors are possible. For 
example, changes in GDP might be decomposed into the contributions of the different inputs 
to production to highlight the roles of adjustment in capital stocks versus interfuel and inter-
material substitution. But this decomposition is much more complex and difficult to compute 
and so we only consider the simple decomposition in equation (1). 
Defining 𝑔 = !!!!"#,  𝐶 = !!!!, 𝐴 = !!!!"#, and  𝐼 = !!"#!!"#, equation (1) can be rewritten as: 𝑔 ≡ 𝐶×𝐴×𝐼. Define ∆𝑔! = 𝑔 𝜎! − 𝑔 𝜎!  as the difference between the percentage GDP 
losses associated with a parameter set 𝜎! and those associated with the default parameter set 𝜎! given a policy scenario. Then we can decompose the difference in percentage GDP losses 
into the contributions of the changes in the three factors, C, A, and I due to the change in the 
parameters.  
As discussed by Ang (2004), a decomposition method without residuals is preferable. Among 
the popular methods, the Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index (LMDI) method (Ang and Liu, 
2001) has no unexplained residual and is the most elegant from a theoretical point of view 
(Ang, 2004). Therefore, we use the LMDI (additive) method as the decomposition method to 
analyze the contribution of each of the three factors to the differences in percentage GDP 
losses between different parameter sets. The formula for LMDI (additive) decomposition is 
given as follows: 
                                                
2 The choice of discount rate is discussed in the Appendix. 
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 ∆𝑔! = 𝑔 𝜎! − 𝑔 𝜎! = ∆𝐶! + ∆𝐴! + ∆𝐼! (2) 
where: 
 ∆𝐶! = 𝑔 𝜎! − 𝑔 𝜎!𝑙𝑛 ! !!! !! ×𝑙𝑛 𝐶!𝐶 𝜎! ,  
 ∆𝐴! = 𝑔 𝜎! − 𝑔 𝜎!𝑙𝑛 ! !!! !! ×𝑙𝑛 𝐴!𝐴 𝜎! , (3) 
 ∆𝐼! = 𝑔 𝜎! − 𝑔 𝜎!𝑙𝑛 ! !!! !! ×𝑙𝑛 𝐼!𝐼 𝜎! ,  
The proportional change in the loss of GDP due to the change in parameters can be obtained 
by dividing both sides of (2) by 𝑔 𝜎! : 
 ∆!!! !! = ! !! !! !!! !! = ∆!!! !! + ∆!!! !! + ∆!!! !!   (4) 
When expressed in percentage terms, the decomposition shows the percentage contributions 
from 𝐶!, 𝐴!, and 𝐼! to a given percentage change in 𝑔!. 
4 Design of Experiments: Targets, Policy Scenarios, and Variation of Parameters 
The simulation experiments involve several steps: first, we build a default model, which uses 
the standard assumptions used in G-Cubed for generating a BAU scenario; second, we 
impose a set of absolute targets and simulate the default model to find policy paths that 
achieve these absolute targets; third, we build a new model and corresponding BAU time 
path by changing the values of a set of parameters of interest while keeping all the other 
assumptions unchanged; finally, we simulate the new model to achieve the same absolute 
targets that we impose in the default model. The last two steps are repeated for various 
perturbed sets of parameters. 
We look at the consequences of policies up till 2030 only as the G-Cubed model is designed 
primarily for shorter-term analysis. The absolute global emissions targets in 2030 are set as 
follows:  
(i) 20% below the 2010 global emissions level (Scenario 1, Target 1); 
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(ii) Constant emissions at the 2010 global level (Scenario 2, Target 2); 
(iii) 20% above the 2010 global emissions level (Scenario 3, Target 3). 
The experiments are not designed to exactly follow any existing policy scenarios, such as the 
EMF22 scenarios (Clarke et al., 2009) or the IPCC’s new Representative Concentration 
Pathways or RCPs (van Vuuren et al., 2011), because: (i) the former scenarios are designed 
to target concentrations of carbon dioxide equivalent greenhouse gases but G-Cubed is not an 
integrated assessment model and neither incorporates GHGs other than CO2 nor any method 
of computing atmospheric concentrations; (ii) even though RCPs have corresponding CO2 
emissions paths for each scenario, exactly following the path will give us a carbon price path 
that fluctuates significantly over time, which is not the economically optimal path. Therefore, 
the above targets allow us to derive a smooth carbon price trajectory to achieve the CO2 
reduction target by 2030. 
While the emission paths do not exactly follow the RCPs, our targets for emissions 
reductions are broadly consistent with the growth of emissions to 2030 relative to 2010 in the 
RCP scenarios. RCP8.5 is a relatively energy intensive BAU scenario where no policy action 
is taken (Riahi et al., 2011; Moss et al., 2010). Our BAU emissions projection in the default 
case is close to RCP8.5 until around 2050 (see Figure 1). We calculate the percentage change 
of the emissions in 2030 relative to the 2010 level for each RCP. The range is between -
18.87% (RCP 2.6) and +27.25% (RCP 4.5) (see Figure 1). Therefore, our targets for the 
scenarios are representative of this range.  
We make three assumptions about the policy scenarios adopted in the experiments. First, we 
assume a global carbon tax that applies to each region in the model such that the global 
emissions target can be achieved in 2030. Second, we use a Hotelling (1931) -type rule to pin 
down the carbon price path. That is, the carbon price increases by 4% (the discount rate in the 
model) per annum from 2013 to 2100.3 Such a policy rule is common in both the climate 
policy literature and policy practice (see, for example, Bosetti et al., 2009; Calvin et al., 
2009; Edmonds et al., 2008; Gurney et al., 2009; Tol, 2009; Carraro et al., 2011; McKibbin 
et al. 2011; Saveyn et al., 2012; Lu et al., 2013). Finally, the carbon tax revenue is returned 
                                                
4 Though we only assess the impact of the policy up to 2030, as agents in G-Cubed are 
forward looking it is important to model the path of the carbon price after 2030. 
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to households as a lump-sum transfer, which is a simple and commonly used assumption in 
climate policy analysis. 
We take G-Cubed’s standard parameter values as the default assumption so that the default 
model is consistent with previous G-Cubed studies. Table IV lays out the design of our 
experiments. In particular, we vary the elasticities in production, capital production, and 
household sectors in separate experiments. By doing so, we can further look at the effect of 
parameter changes on different parts of the economy. The alternative parameter sets in Table 
IV can be grouped in three blocks: A1-A3 include changes in the goods production block; 
A4-A6 include changes in the capital production block; A10-A12 include changes in the 
household block. A7-A9 are different combinations of the goods production block and capital 
production block. More generally, A1-A9 represent changes in production elasticities, A10-
A12 changes in consumption elasticities, and A13 is a case in which all the elasticities of 
interest are changed. The variation of parameter values is symmetric in percentage terms. The 
range of ±50% will give us a good variation as the inputs in some sectors will turn from poor 
(good) substitutes to good (poor) substitutes. To incorporate some insights from empirical 
studies, we also test four special parameter sets. Table IV. “C” denotes Clements where all 
the relevant elasticities of substitution are 0.5, (see Clements, 2008). “S” denotes Stern where 
the top tier elasticities are 0.5 and the inter-fuel ones are 1, which is generally consistent with 
Stern’s (2012) estimates. Compared to the default model, the top-tier elasticities are a bit 
tighter on average in the Clements assumption while the inter-fuel substitution is a bit more 
relaxed. The Stern assumption further relaxes the inter-fuel elasticities of substitution. “EL” 
and “EH” denotes, respectively, “extremely low” where we assume all the elasticities are 
only 0.1, and “extremely high” where all the elasticities are assumed to be 2. These two 
parameter sets are unrealistic, but illustrate some extreme scenarios. We also ran some 
models where we also changed the elasticities of substitution that aggregate materials into 
material bundles. The results were almost identical to the A13 scenario and so we do not 
report these. 
5 Results 
5.1 Scenarios Using the Default Parameter Set 
In the default parameter setting, the initial carbon taxes in 2013 range from $37 per tonne of 
carbon ($10 per tonne of CO2) to $63 per tonne of carbon ($17 per tonne of CO2) across the 
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three policy scenarios. Figure 2 compares the converted CO2 prices in 2020 in 2005 US 
dollars with the prices simulated in EMF22 (Clarke et al., 2009). Our simulated carbon prices 
are within the range of the carbon prices from the EMF22 scenarios.4 This indicates that our 
default results are within a sensible range among the various models in this field.  
Table V. summarizes the discounted cumulative GDP losses and cumulative emissions 
reduction relative to BAU from 2013 to 2030 as well as the present value of average 
abatement cost expressed in terms of loss of GDP per tonne of carbon abated. The average 
abatement cost measured by ∆!∆! is almost constant across the different scenarios, around $103 
per tonne of carbon. The GDP losses for each region and the world in 2030 relative to BAU – 
how much lower GDP is in 2030, rather than the discounted sum of losses to 2030 - are 
presented in Table VI. The cost, on both the regional and world level, decreases consistently 
as the target becomes looser. As expected, costs are highest in energy exporting developing 
countries (EEB and OPEC) and also in energy exporting developed countries (Australia and 
Canada). Among other developed countries costs are highest in Japan and lowest in the US, 
which is counter to the predictions of Stern et al. (2012) but may be explained by tax 
interaction effects (Paltsev and Capros, 2013). As predicted by Stern et al. (2012) costs are 
higher for developing countries than developed countries on the whole, but again 
unexpectedly they are relatively low in India compared to China.5 
5.2 Factor Decomposition of GDP Losses Under Alternative Parameter Sets 
We first present results for the world as a whole, and then do some comparisons across 
regions. 
                                                
4 As most participating models failed to simulate the EMF22 450CO2e scenario (comparable 
to RCP2.6), we compare our default carbon prices with the “Full participation and not-to-
exceed” scenarios of 650CO2e (comparable to RCP4.5) and 550CO2e targets (comparable to a 
path somewhere between RCP2.6 and RCP4.5).  
5 However, in terms of average abatement costs (GDP losses/emissions abated), India ($80 
per tonne of CO2) has a similar cost to China ($87 per tonne of CO2) in 2030. BAU emissions 
intensity is higher in China – in 2030 it is 1.29 kg of CO2 per dollar vs. 0.91 kg of CO2 per 
dollar in India. The latter does increase costs in China. The main difference, however, is from 
the amount of abated emissions. The cut in emissions in percentage terms as a result of the 
common carbon tax is much less in India. As a result the loss of GDP is much less in India. 
There may be various reasons for this difference including differences in industrial structure, 
which we do not explore further. 
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5.2.1 World Level 
Table VII provides an overview of the changes in the discounted GDP losses using each 
parameter set across the three policy scenarios.  
The most noticeable features of these results are as follows. First, the changes in the GDP 
losses under the alternative parameter sets compared to the default parameter set are mostly 
quite small. The largest increase in cost is when we use the EH parameter set under Scenario 
3 resulting in an increase in the GDP loss of 0.68 percentage points relative to its BAU. 
Second, higher flexibility does not necessarily mean lower GDP losses relative to BAU; on 
the contrary, in most cases, less flexible economies give us lower GDP losses relative to 
BAU and more flexible economies have higher costs. The EL parameter set has the lowest 
costs of all. For Scenarios 2 and 3 the carbon tax is in fact negative and so we have not 
reported a GDP loss. Decomposition analysis can help explain these counter-intuitive results 
and show us how much the elasticity parameters affect each factor that contributes to the 
change of GDP losses. 
Figure 3 visualizes the decomposition in percentage terms for the most and least stringent 
policy scenarios and for more and less flexible (than the default) parameter sets in separate 
graphs. To provide some intuition, a negative (positive) value for Δg implies that GDP losses 
are lower (higher) in absolute terms with this parameter set than when using the default. This 
is because 𝑔 𝜎!  in Equation (4) is negative, so that a negative value for ∆!!! !!  implies that the 
GDP loss is less in absolute terms under the alternative parameter set than under the default 
parameter set and a positive value indicates that costs have increased. The bars for ∆C, ∆A, 
and ∆I indicate the contributions to the change in the loss of GDP (Δg) from the change in the 
average abatement cost factor, the change in abatement relative to BAU, and from the change 
in the BAU intensity factor, respectively. From these results, we can make several 
observations. 
First, the changes in GDP losses are mainly due to the change in abatement cost per tonne of 
carbon, positive ∆C, under the less flexible parameter sets while it is mainly affected by the 
change in the amount of emissions to be abated (ΔA) under the more flexible parameter sets. 
However, the effects in terms of GDP losses (∆g) of changing elasticities of substitution in 
different sectors (or blocks) vary a lot. The effect of the elasticities in the capital producing 
sector (A4-A6) on GDP is negligible while the effect is large in the goods production sectors 
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(A1-A3). The impact of inter-fuel substitution (A2) on the variation of GDP losses (∆g) is 
mainly due to the response of average abatement cost (∆C) whereas the abatement factor 
(∆A) dominates the other factors in the household consumption sector (A10). Furthermore, 
from Table VIII, we can see that as policy scenarios become more stringent, the contribution 
from average abatement cost (∆C) grows while the contribution from abatement (∆A) 
diminishes. Generally, the contribution from the change in BAU intensity (∆I) is quite small 
compared to that of other factors.  
Second, comparing A1 with A2, and A10 with A11, we see that the top tier elasticities of 
substitution have more impact on the average abatement cost (∆C) than inter-fuel elasticities 
of substitution do in both the production and household sectors. This result is consistent with 
Jacoby et al. (2006)’s finding that the elasticity of substitution between the energy and labor-
capital bundle turns out to be the most important parameter of those they test in terms of 
welfare cost. Similarly, Babonneau et al. (2012) find that the top-tier elasticity has a greater 
effect on the carbon price than the interfuel elasticity of substitution. 
Third, the effect of changes in the elasticities of substitution on average abatement cost is not 
symmetric. Generally a given percentage increase in flexibility leads to a smaller percentage 
decrease in average abatement cost than the percentage increase in cost resulting from the 
same percentage decrease in flexibility. This suggests that underestimation of elasticity 
parameters in CGE models like G-Cubed will cause a greater bias in estimated abatement 
cost than overestimation will. In summary, it is clear that the top tier elasticity of substitution 
has the largest impact on the average abatement cost and this impact is nonlinear. In terms of 
total GDP losses relative to BAU, further factor decomposition is needed to distinguish what 
drives the variation: whether it is from the changing average abatement cost in response to 
policy shock or from the varying BAU scenario due to varied flexibility. There are also 
different factors driving the results for different categories of elasticity of substitution. 
Table VIII provides a closer look at the alternative parameter set A13 and the four special 
parameter sets, where all the elasticities of interest are varied. In general, the Clements 
parameter set (C) and the Stern parameter set (S) lead to lower mitigation cost, compared to 
the default model. This suggests that relaxation of the elasticity of substitution in the 
electricity sector (from 0.2) is more important than the tightening of the elasticities of 
substitution in other sectors such as coal mining. The effects from the change in BAU 
emissions are very similar for both parameter sets, and the major difference is the effect of 
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average abatement cost. This indicates that inter-fuel substitution has little impact on the 
BAU projection, but a significant impact on the average abatement cost. When the economy 
is highly inflexible (EL) there is no need for mitigation policy under the less stringent targets. 
In fact, the optimal carbon tax is negative. It is interesting to note that while the extreme 
elasticity assumptions have a large impact on average abatement cost, they also have a 
significant impact on the BAU projection.  
5.2.2 Regional Comparison  
In our experiments, there are important differences between the behavior of regions and 
countries in the decomposition analysis. In the following analysis, we will compare some 
representative regions/countries from different groups, specifically developed vs. developing 
economies and energy importing vs. energy-exporting economies. 
In this version of G-Cubed, there are five developed regions and six developing regions. A 
closer look at the differences in the factor decomposition between the developed and 
developing regions reveals quite a few differences across regions. The US (USA), Japan 
(JPN), and the western part of the European Union (EUW) are typical energy-importing 
developed regions while China (CHI), Brazil (BRA), and India (IND) are typical energy-
importing developing regions. Figure 4 shows the decomposition results for the US and 
China under the most stringent policy scenario (Scenario 1).  
It is notable, that the effect of average abatement cost (ΔC) on the total cost variation is 
generally much larger for the US than for China, while the abatement relative to BAU (ΔA) 
and the BAU emissions intensity (ΔI) are more sensitive to changing elasticities for China 
than for the US. For the US, the greatest change in GDP losses occurs when the production 
sector is either more or less flexible (A3) and it is driven by increased or reduced average 
abatement cost. For China it occurs when the top tier of household consumption is more or 
less flexible (A10) and it is driven by the change of BAU emissions, which results in change 
in the required percentage reduction of emissions. It is also interesting to note, that GDP 
losses in developed regions are more sensitive to the substitution elasticities of the capital-
producing sector than are GDP losses in developing regions, although the effect is generally 
small for all regions. Developed regions are more capital intensive and the capital-producing 
sector is much larger than in developing regions. Therefore, these elasticities would be 
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expected to have a larger effect on the economy in developed regions. These observations 
mostly hold for other developed and developing regions too.  
It is also of interest to see how differently the energy-importing regions and energy-exporting 
regions respond to changes in the elasticities of substitution. Australia (AUS), Eastern Europe 
and the Former Soviet Union (EEB), and OPEC (OPC) are the major net energy-exporting 
regions while the US (USA), Japan (JPN), and the western European Union (EUW) are the 
major developed net energy-importing regions. 
It is clear from Figure 5, that as we would expect from Stern et al. (2012), the average 
abatement cost (C) in energy-exporting regions (AUS, EEB and OPC) is less sensitive to the 
elasticities of substitution than it is in energy-importing regions (USA, JPN and EUW). In 
addition, the change in total costs, g, in response to changes in the elasticities is also quite 
different for the two groups (see Table IX). When flexibility is increased, energy-exporting 
regions tend to have higher total mitigation cost relative to the default model while energy-
importing regions have exactly the opposite response. The change of total mitigation cost for 
energy-exporting regions is driven by the BAU effect (ΔA and ΔI) while it is driven by the 
average abatement cost effect (ΔC) for energy-importing regions (see Figure 6). 
There are probably two reasons for this. First, average abatement costs tend to be inversely 
related to total costs of abatement (Stern et al., 2012) as, ignoring other factors such as tax 
interaction effects, the former are low and the latter high in emissions intensive countries. 
Second, the major effect of global emissions mitigation on energy-exporting regions is likely 
to be due to lower demand for their exports of energy goods. In other words, the mitigation 
within energy-exporting regions is mainly accomplished by output reduction due to less 
external energy demand rather than from a domestic adjustment of production structure.  
Another observation from the decomposition analysis is that energy-exporting regions are 
less sensitive to the production sector’s elasticity of substitution, but more sensitive to the 
change of elasticities in household consumption and the change of all elasticities (A13). 
However, energy-importing regions have the opposite characteristics as demonstrated in 
Figure 6 that contrasts OPEC (energy-exporting region) to EUW (energy-importing region). 
The GDP losses in OPEC are mainly driven by changes in BAU emissions, which determine 
the percentage abatement needed. Changes in BAU emissions intensity due to more or less 
flexibility play a role in the EUW GDP losses, but the average abatement cost effect still 
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dominates. The flexibility in the household consumption bundle both at home and abroad 
seems important to energy-exporting regions as it will largely affect the global energy 
demand and through international trade, the net energy-exporters are affected more than 
energy-importing regions by mitigation elsewhere. 
6 Discussion and Conclusions 
In this section, we compare our results with previous relevant studies, provide some general 
conclusions, and then point out implications for future research and policy in this field.  
Regarding average abatement costs, our results are qualitatively consistent with Jorgenson et 
al. (2000) and Babonneau et al. (2012). The average cost of emissions reductions is generally 
higher when substitution is more restricted. In the model where we change all elasticities of 
substitution, A13, the average abatement cost at the world level increases (decreases) by 61% 
(38%) if the world economy is 50% less (more) flexible compared to our base case. These 
results also show the nonlinearity of average abatement cost in elasticities of substitution - the 
average abatement cost increases more when the elasticities of substitution are lowered than 
it decreases when the elasticities of substitution are increased by the same percentage. This 
finding implies that overestimation of mitigation cost due to underestimating the elasticities 
of substitution would be a more serious problem in CGE models than underestimation of cost 
due to overestimating the elasticities of substitution. Similarly, Pindyck (2013) and N. Stern 
(2013) argue that the benefits of climate policy have been underestimated because of 
uncertainties in climate impact parameters in integrated assessment models. In particular, the 
climate sensitivity to doubling carbon dioxide is uncertain more on the upper tail where 
impacts are larger than on the lower tail where impacts are lower. 
In common with Jacoby et al. (2006) and Babonneau et al. (2012), we find that average 
abatement costs are generally more sensitive to changes in top tier (labor, capital, energy, and 
materials) substitution possibilities than to changes in inter-fuel substitution possibilities. 
Changes in flexibility in the capital-producing sector are also important for developed 
(capital-intensive) economies. For energy exporting regions, household consumption 
substitution has a greater effect on total mitigation cost (GDP losses) than substitution in the 
production sector; but the average abatement cost is more sensitive to substitution in the 
production sector than in the household consumption sector. From our decomposition 
analysis, we notice that changing the elasticity of substitution in consumption changes BAU 
emissions a lot in these regions, but does not affect the average abatement cost much. This is 
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due to reduced global demand for the energy exported from these regions when consumers 
globally have less flexibility in consumption choices. 
We also find that inter-fuel substitution elasticities have a significant impact on average 
abatement cost, but not on BAU emissions. Top-tier (KLEM) elasticities of substitution 
strongly affect BAU emissions. As predicted by de La Grandville (1989), less flexible 
economies grow more slowly and as a result also have less emissions growth. The total costs 
of mitigation are, therefore, lower in these economies than in more flexible economies. In the 
case of our extreme low flexibility parameter set (all relevant elasticities are 0.1), there is 
little GDP or emissions growth at all, and no need for mitigation actions under the two less 
stringent policy scenarios. Though we set out to test whether the costs of mitigation policies 
might be very high in less flexible economies we found seemingly paradoxically that there is 
less need for climate policy in such economies because emissions grow more slowly under 
BAU. 
Although the quantitative results in this study are derived from a particular model, the results 
suggest that it is important to reduce the uncertainty regarding substitution possibilities in 
climate policy assessment and to differentiate between the costs of relative and absolute 
targets and between marginal, average, and total costs as already argued by Stern et al. 
(2012). Our results show that, if we are interested in the total costs of mitigation policy then 
accurate estimates of substitution elasticities are not that important. If we are interested in 
marginal or average costs, then accurate parameter estimates are important. 
Our findings need to be taken into account when interpreting the results of model comparison 
exercises. Most model comparisons, such as EMF22 (Clarke et al., 2009), show a wide range 
of mitigation costs across models for common absolute targets. But each of these models has 
a different BAU emissions projection. It is then important to identify whether the variation of 
these mitigation costs is due to the varying BAU scenarios in each model or from the induced 
costs of mitigation policy. There is a necessity for sensitivity and decomposition analysis to 
provide further policy recommendation using CGE models.  
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Figure 1. RCPs and emissions targets (percentage relative to 2010 level) 
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Figure 3. LMDI decomposition (index) of world GDP losses under Scenarios 1 and	3	
 
 
Figure 4. The LMDI decomposition (index) of US and China (Scenario 1) 
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Figure 5. Energy exporting regions vs. energy importing regions:  
average abatement cost component (ΔC, %) under parameter set (A13) and Scenario 1 
 
Figure 6. The LMDI decomposition (index) of OPEC and EUW (Scenario 1) 
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(b)	EUW	Scenario	1	(less	flexible)
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(a) Production Nesting 
 
 
(b) Consumption Structure 
Figure A1. Production and consumption structure in G-Cubed 	 	
Table I. Regional aggregation of the model (G-Cubed, version D) 
Region Name Region Code  Region Description 
USA USA United States 
Japan JPN Japan 
Australia AUS Australia 
Europe EUW European Union 
Rest of the 
Advanced 
Economies 
OEC Canada and New Zealand 
China CHI China 
India IND India 
Brazil BRA Brazil 
OPEC OPC Oil Exporting and other Middle Eastern 
Countries 
EEFSU EEB Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union 
ROW ROW Rest of the World 
 
Table II. Sector aggregation in the model (G-Cubed, version D) 
Number Sector Definition 
1 Electric Utilities 
2 Gas Utilities 
3 Petroleum Refining 
4 Coal Mining 
5 Crude Oil Extraction 
6 Gas Extraction 
7 Mining 
8 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and 
Hunting 
9 Durable Manufacturing 
10 Non-Durable Manufacturing 
11 Transportation 
12 Services 
13 Capital Producing Sector 
14 Household Capital Producing 
Sector 
 
Table III. Key elasticities of substitution in G-Cubed 
 Sectors Top tier (O) Energy tier (E) 
σi (i=O, E) 	
1. Electric utilities 0.20 0.20 
2. Gas utilities 0.81 0.50 
3. Petroleum refining 0.54 0.20 
4. Coal mining 1.70 0.16 
5. Crude oil extraction 0.49 0.14 
6. Gas extraction 0.49 0.14 
7. Mining 1.00 0.50 
8. Agriculture, forestry, fishing and 
hunting 1.28 0.50 
9. Durable manufacturing 0.41 0.50 
10. Non-durable manufacturing 0.5 0.50 
11. Transportation 0.54 0.50 
12. Services 0.26 0.32 
σiR (i=O, E) Capital producing sector 1.10 0.5 
σiH (i=O, E) Household consumption 0.8 0.5 
Note: O denotes the top tier nesting between Capital (K), Labor (L), Energy (E) and 
Materials (M). E denotes the energy level nesting between the 6 energy goods corresponding 
to the first 6 sectors in Table II. 
Table IV. Simulation experiments design 
 Default Variations Alternative Parameter Sets Special Assumptions +50% -50% A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 C S EL EH 
 
S 1 0.20	 0.30	 0.10	 X  X    X  X    X 
0.5	
0.5	
0.1	 2	
S 2 0.81	 1.21	 0.41	 X  X    X  X    X 
S 3 0.54	 0.81	 0.27	 X  X    X  X    X 
S 4 1.70	 2.56	 0.85	 X  X    X  X    X 
S 5 0.49	 0.74	 0.25	 X  X    X  X    X 
S 6 0.49	 0.74	 0.25	 X  X    X  X    X 
S 7 1.00	 1.50	 0.50	 X  X    X  X    X 
S 8 1.28	 1.93	 0.64	 X  X    X  X    X 
S 9 0.41	 0.62	 0.21	 X  X    X  X    X 
S 10 0.50	 0.75	 0.25	 X  X    X  X    X 
S 11 0.54	 0.81	 0.27	 X  X    X  X    X 
S 12 0.26	 0.38	 0.13	 X  X    X  X    X 
 
S 1 0.20	 0.30	 0.10	  X X     X X    X 
1	
S 2 0.50	 0.75	 0.25	  X X     X X    X 
S 3 0.20	 0.30	 0.10	  X X     X X    X 
S 4 0.16	 0.24	 0.08	  X X     X X    X 
S 5 0.14	 0.21	 0.07	  X X     X X    X 
S 6 0.14	 0.21	 0.07	  X X     X X    X 
S 7 0.50	 0.75	 0.25	  X X     X X    X 
S 8 0.50	 0.75	 0.25	  X X     X X    X 
S 9 0.50	 0.75	 0.25	  X X     X X    X 
S 10 0.50	 0.75	 0.25	  X X     X X    X 
S 11 0.50	 0.75	 0.25	  X X     X X    X 
S 12 0.32	 0.48	 0.16	  X X     X X    X 
 1.10	 1.65	 0.55	 	   X  X X  X    X 0.5	
 0.50	 0.75	 0.25	 	    X X  X X    X 1	
 0.80	 1.20	 0.40	 	         X  X X 0.5	
 0.50	 0.75	 0.25	 	          X X X 1	
Note: (1) “X” indicates a change of parameter value from the default case. (2) “S+ a number from 1 to 12” in Column 2 corresponds to sector number as shown in Table II 
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Table V. Global discounted GDP losses and cumulative emissions abatement 
Policy 
Scenario 
World Discounted GDP Losses World Cumulative Abatement World Average 
Cost (2010 
USD/tonne of 
carbon) 
Absolute value 
(Trillions of 2010 
USD) 
Percentage 
(%) 
Absolute value  
(Billions of tonnes of 
carbon) 
Percentage 
(%) 
Scenario 1 
(Target 1) -34.0 -3.02 -329.1 -41.76 103.35 
Scenario 2 
(Target 2) -26.8 -2.38 -259.5 -32.93 103.24 
Scenario 3 
(Target 3) -19.6 -1.74 -190.1 -24.12 103.14 
Note: GDP losses are net present value discounted at 4% per year. 
Table VI. GDP losses (%) in 2030 for the three scenarios relative to BAU 
 Scenario 1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
USA -1.28 -1.14 -0.93 
JPN -4.30 -3.61 -2.80 
AUS -4.50 -3.51 -2.54 
EUW -2.68 -2.24 -1.74 
OEC -4.36 -3.47 -2.57 
CHI -6.28 -4.56 -3.04 
IND -1.98 -1.40 -0.91 
BRA -0.99 -0.85 -0.68 
ROW -5.98 -4.76 -3.52 
EEB -10.62 -8.12 -5.77 
OPC -12.71 -9.94 -7.22 
World -4.20 -3.32 -2.44 
 
Table VII. Discounted GDP losses (%) on the world level using different parameter sets 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Default -3.02 -2.38 -1.74 
Panel A: Less flexible by 50% 
A1  -3.02 -2.23 -1.44 
A2  -3.33 -2.62 -1.92 
A3  -3.34 -2.54 -1.64 
A4  -2.96 -2.31 -1.67 
A5  -3.02 -2.38 -1.74 
A6  -2.96 -2.32 -1.68 
A7  -2.92 -2.12 -1.32 
A8  -3.33 -2.62 -1.92 
A9  -3.34 -2.42 -1.52 
A10  -2.56 -1.87 -1.19 
A11  -3.06 -2.41 -1.76 
A12  -2.59 -1.89 -1.19 
A13   -2.67 -1.60 -0.55 
Panel B: More flexible by 50% 
A1  -3.09 -2.54 -2.00 
A2  -2.77 -2.18 -1.60 
A3  -2.87 -2.36 -1.85 
A4  -3.00 -2.36 -1.72 
A5  -3.02 -2.38 -1.74 
A6  -3.00 -2.36 -1.72 
A7  -3.27 -2.72 -2.17 
A8  -2.77 -2.18 -1.59 
A9  -2.96 -2.45 -1.94 
A10  -3.41 -2.81 -2.21 
A11  -2.98 -2.35 -1.73 
A12  -3.37 -2.78 -2.19 
A13  -3.23 -2.74 -2.26 
Special Assumptions 
C  -2.14 -1.60 -1.06 
S  -1.62 -1.20 -0.80 
EL  -1.54 NA NA 
EH  -2.85 -2.63 -2.42 
 
Table VIII. LMDI decomposition (index) of discounted world GDP losses in A13 and 
Special Assumptions 
 𝑔 𝜎! a Parameter setb ∆𝑔!𝑔 𝜎!  ∆𝐶!𝑔 𝜎!  ∆𝐴!𝑔 𝜎!  ∆𝐼!𝑔 𝜎!  
Scenario 
1 -3.02 
A13 (-50%) -11.65 43.68 -38.72 -16.61 
A13 (+50%) 6.95 -26.87 20.28 13.54 
C -29.02 -14.29 -9.92 -4.80 
S -46.51 -33.09 -9.13 -4.29 
EL -48.92 67.58 -91.85 -24.66 
EH -5.72 -101.66 49.93 46.01 
Scenario 
2 -2.38 
A13 (-50%) -32.57 38.61 -56.58 -14.60 
A13 (+50%) 15.36 -28.03 29.32 14.07 
C -32.76 -13.90 -14.18 -4.68 
S -49.37 -32.39 -12.80 -4.19 
ELc NA NA NA NA 
EH 10.64 -110.22 71.00 49.86 
Scenario 
3 -1.74 
A13 (-50%) -68.29 27.97 -85.76 -10.50 
A13 (+50%) 29.83 -29.92 44.80 14.96 
C -39.13 -13.25 -21.41 -4.47 
S -54.22 -31.07 -19.14 -4.01 
ELc NA NA NA NA 
EH 38.83 -124.05 106.80 56.07 
Note: a The second column of the table gives the GDP loss in percentage terms using the 
default parameter set. The final four columns of the table give the terms of Equation (4) in 
percentages. b Parameter sets A13 (-50%) and A13 (+50%) are where all elasticities of 
interest are varied by -50% or +50% relative to the default case. The other four parameter 
sets are defined in the text. c In Scenarios 2 and 3, the BAU emissions projection from the 
parameter set “extremely low (EL) elasticities” is so low that there is no need for a carbon tax 
to achieve the targets. 
 
Table	IX.	Energy exporting regions vs. developed energy importing regions:  
Changes in discounted GDP losses (%) under alternative parameter sets  
  ∆!!! !!  under A13 (-50%) ∆!!! !!  under A13 (+50%) 
Energy-exporting 
regions 
AUS -27.59% 14.97% 
EEB -24.69% 16.24% 
OPC -26.80% 16.17% 
Energy-importing 
regions 
USA 83.44% -56.98% 
JPN -0.33% -26.95% 
EUW 8.85% -5.00% 
World -11.65% 6.95% 		 	
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Appendix: The G-Cubed Model 
G-Cubed has some important features that make it particularly suitable for our analysis. G-
Cubed has various tiers of nesting on the production and consumption sides, which allows us 
to explore the substitutability of the economy at different levels (see Figure A1). In the 
following, we describe the features of the model that are most relevant to our sensitivity 
analysis. McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999, 2013) provide a more complete description of the 
model. There are twelve production sectors where the top tier level of production is modeled 
as a CES function of capital, labor, energy and materials: 
 𝑄! = 𝐴!! (𝛿!"! ) !!!!(𝐴!!𝑋!")!!!!!!!!!!!,!,!,!
!!!!!!!!, (A1) 
where Qi is the output for sector i, Xij is the inputs for sector i; AiO, σiO, and δijO are parameters 
that reflect technology, elasticity of substitution, and input weights, respectively. Particularly, 
AjO (j = K, L, E, M) is the factor-specific technology parameter at the top tier. The energy (XiE) 
and materials (XiM) inputs in (1) are also modeled as CES functions of component energy 
carriers and materials: 
 𝑋!" = (𝛿!"!) !!!!(𝑋!"!)!!!!!!!!!!!,…,!
!!!!!!!!
 (A2) 
where X,iE is the aggregate energy used in sector i. The XijE represent outputs of the six energy 
producing sectors including: electricity, crude oil, coal, petroleum, natural gas and its utility; 
σiE and δijE are inter-fuel elasticity and input weights parameters, respectively. Similarly the 
aggregate material input is a CES aggregate of the outputs from the six “materials” producing 
sectors of the economy. Materials in fact include transportation and services inputs. Each of 
these lower tier inputs – both materials and energy - are a CES aggregate of domestic and 
imported commodities where the elasticity of substitution is the Armington elasticity. 
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In addition to the twelve ordinary industrial sectors, there are also a capital goods production 
sector, which has a similar nesting, with σOR and σER being the elasticity parameters in the two 
tiers.6 
In common with most studies using G-Cubed, the major sources of technological change are 
in the form of labor augmenting technical change and autonomous energy efficiency 
improvement (AEEI) (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1999; McKibbin et al., 2008). Our 
assumptions about the rates of labor productivity growth and AEEI are documented in Tables 
A1 and A2. These technological change parameters have an impact on both the BAU 
projections of GDP and emissions as well as on the costs of mitigation. The relative price of 
labor and energy will regulate the energy consumption and emissions path over time. The 
higher the prices of other factors of production are relative to the price of energy in the 
business as usual projection, the higher mitigation costs will be. Labor augmentation and 
capital-energy substitution can increase the amount of electricity produced per unit input of 
fossil fuels over time up to some limit of productivity as assumed.  
On the household side, the representative household utility function is given by: 
 𝑈! = ln𝐶 𝑠 + ln𝐺(𝑠) 𝑒!!(!!!)𝑑𝑠!!  (A3) 
where C is aggregate consumption and G is government consumption, which is intended to 
measure the provision of public goods; θ is the rate of pure time preference. Aggregate 
consumption C also has two layers of CES nesting: one is the top tier nesting of household 
capital, labor, energy, and materials; the lower tier consists of inter-fuel nesting for energy 
(with elasticity σEH) and nesting for material goods (with elasticity σMH). Therefore, the top 
tier consumption aggregate is as follows: 
 𝐶 = (𝛿!"! ) !!!!"(𝑋!")!!!"!!!!!"!!!,!,!,!
!!!"!!!"!!
 (A4) 
                                                
6 There is also a household capital producing sector in a similar nesting; but the elasticity of 
substitution is not of interest here in this study. 
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in which σCOH and δCj are the elasticity of substitution between the 12 consumption goods and 
the corresponding weights parameters, respectively. The elasticities: σiO, σiE, σOR, σER, σOH, 
and σEH are the parameters of interest in our sensitivity analysis. 
We set the rate of time preference to 2.2% and the annual growth rate of effective labor in the 
steady state to 1.8%.7 Since the quantity and value variables in the model are scaled by the 
number of effective labor units, the growth rate of effective labor units appears in the 
discount factor. These quantity and value variables must be converted back to their original 
form (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2013). Since utility is in a log-linear form as in equation 
(A3), the elasticity of marginal utility is 1 and our discounting rule is consistent with the 
modified Ramsey discounting rule in climate economic modeling (e.g. Tol, 2011). Therefore, 
G-Cubed assumes that the long-term real interest rate converges to 4% at the steady state, 
which is comparable to the discount rate of 4.3% in Nordhaus (2007)’s DICE model. This 
rate is used in computing the net present value of mitigation costs in our study.  
The G-Cubed model also features macro-economic characteristics such as partly rational 
expectations, price stickiness, and a central bank policy rule. These distinctive features that 
most recursive CGE models do not have, give the model rich short-run dynamics and make 
the model more suitable for short to medium term scenario analysis. While long-run 
consequences are the usual focus of climate scientists, the short-run to medium run (two to 
three decades) dynamics are probably more relevant to policy-makers and economists. G-
Cubed also features a comprehensive representation of international trade, which is important 
for issues in a global context, such as climate change. 
                                                
7 The growth rate of effective labor is the sum of the growth rate of population and the 
growth rate of technology, which is a steady state assumption. In G-Cubed, the model is 
computed till far in the future (i.e. 2130) to approximate the steady state, but the reported 
projection is only till 2100. In our analysis, we only look at the period till 2030. 
Table A1. Labor productivity assumptions 
USA 
Sector 1 and 2 and sector 7-12 grow at 1.8% per annum, and sector 3-6 grow at 
0.5% per annum. Sector 13 and 14 (financial sectors) grows at 1.8% per annum 
constantly. There’s cross-sectoral convergence at the rate of 0.03 (3%) per 
annum. 
JPN All sectors are of the same labor productivity as in USA. Catch-up rate is 2% per annum in all sectors. 
AUS 
Sectors 1-12 are 80% of the USA labor productivity, financial sectors 13 and 14 
are of the same labor productivity as in USA. Catch-up rate is 2% per annum in 
all sectors. 
EUW All sectors are of the same labor productivity as in USA. Catch-up rate is 2% per annum in all sectors. 
OEC 
Sectors 1-12 are 90% of labor productivity in USA, financial sectors 13 and 14 
are of the same labor productivity as in USA. Catch-up rate is 2% per annum in 
all sectors. 
CHI 
Sector 1-6 is 90% of the USA labor productivity, sector 7-12 are 20% of USA 
labor productivity. Sector 13 and 14 are of the same labor productivity as in 
USA. Catch-up rate starts from 1% in the initial year, and increase by 0.1 
percentage points per annum till 10 years after the initial year to reach 2% per 
annum and then it follows this rate afterwards. 
IND 
Sector 1-6 is 90% of the USA labor productivity, sector 7-12 are 20% of USA 
labor productivity. Sector 13 and 14 are of the same labor productivity as in 
USA. Catch-up rate starts from 1% in the initial year, and increase by 0.1 
percentage points per annum till 10 years after the initial year to reach 2% per 
annum and then it follows this rate afterwards. 
BRA 
Sector 1-6 is 90% of the USA labor productivity, sector 7-12 are 20% of USA 
labor productivity. Sector 13 and 14 are of the same labor productivity as in 
USA. Catch-up rate starts from 1% in the initial year, and increase by 0.1 
percentage points per annum till 10 years after the initial year to reach 2% per 
annum and then it follows this rate afterwards. 
ROW 
Sector 1-6 is 90% of the USA labor productivity, sector 7-12 are 14% of USA 
labor productivity. Sector 13 and 14 are of the same labor productivity as in 
USA. 
EEB 
Sector 1-6 is 90% of the USA labor productivity, sector 7-12 are 40% of USA 
labor productivity. Sector 13 and 14 are of the same labor productivity as in 
USA. Catch-up rate starts from 1% in the initial year, and increase by 0.1 
percentage points per annum till 10 years after the initial year to reach 2% per 
annum and then it follows this rate afterwards. Catch-up rate starts from 0.5% 
in the initial year, and increase by 0.1 percentage points per annum till 20 years 
after the initial year to reach 2% per annum and then it follows this rate 
afterwards. 
OPC 
Sector 1-6 is 90% of the USA labor productivity, sector 7-12 are 30% of USA 
labor productivity. Sector 13 and 14 are of the same labor productivity as in 
USA. Catch-up rate starts from 0.5% in the initial year, and increase by 0.1 
percentage points per annum till 20 years after the initial year to reach 2% per 
annum and then it follows this rate afterwards. 
 
  
Table A2. Autonomous Energy Efficiency Improvement (AEEI) assumptions 
USA 2% per annum in sector 1-2 and 7-12, no improvement in sector 3-6; household AEEI improves 3% per annum. 
JPN 2% per annum in sector 1-2 and 7-12, no improvement in sector 3-6; household AEEI improves 3% per annum. 
AUS 2% per annum in sector 1-2 and 7-12, no improvement in sector 3-6; household AEEI improves 3% per annum. 
EUW 2% per annum in sector 1-2 and 7-12, no improvement in sector 3-6; household AEEI improves 3% per annum. 
OEC 2% per annum in sector 1-2 and 7-12, no improvement in sector 3-6; household AEEI improves 3% per annum. 
CHI 2% per annum in sector 1-2, 6% per annum in sector 7-12, no improvement in sector 3-6; household AEEI improves 6% per annum. 
IND 2% per annum in sector 1-2, 6% per annum in sector 7-12, no improvement in sector 3-6; household AEEI improves 6% per annum. 
BRA 2% per annum in sector 1-2, 6% per annum in sector 7-12, no improvement in sector 3-6; household AEEI improves 6% per annum. 
ROW 2% per annum in sector 1-2 and 7-12, no improvement in sector 3-6; household AEEI improves 6% per annum. 
EEB 1% per annum in sector 7-12, no improvement in sector 1-6; household AEEI improves 1% per annum. 
OPC 1% per annum in sector 1-2 and 7-12, no improvement in sector 3-6; household AEEI improves 4% per annum. 
 
